COMMANDERS DIGEST

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DOD Issues Comparison Of Strategic Forces Of U.S., Soviet Union

In reply to inquiries concerning strategic forces of the U.S. vs. the Soviet Union, the Department of Defense issued the following statement Feb. 19:

As indicated in public statements by the Department of Defense over the past several years, the Soviets, in reaction to the rapid build-up of U.S. land and sea based missile forces, have reinforced their own second strike capability. As Secretary McNamara has reported to the Congress, with the rate of build up we project, we believe that by mid-1969 the Soviets may have as many land based ICBM launchers as we have. However, their submarine based intercontinental launchers will continue to remain small in number versus ours and they are unlikely to possess a total of land and sea based ICBM launchers equal to ours until the latter part of the 1970s, if then.

These are developments we have long assumed would occur, and we have already taken measures to assure that the U.S. will continue to maintain a strategic nuclear force of far greater effective destructive power than that of the Soviet Union. Our installation of multiple separately targeted warheads in our Minuteman and Poseidon launchers will mean that the U.S. will maintain a commanding lead in the number of warheads capable of being launched against enemy targets.

We have today approximately 4200 separately targetable strategic warheads versus somewhat less than 1,000 Soviet separately targetable warheads. Those figures include intercontinental

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Sec. Ignatius Outlines Navy Needs For FY69 in Senate Testimony

Secretary of the Navy Paul R. Ignatius has outlined for Congress the aircraft, ships, missiles and support equipment the Navy says it will require during fiscal 1969 to maintain its position as the number one seapower in the world.

Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Mr. Ignatius described the Navy Department's requests in strategic offensive and defensive forces, tactical air forces, fleet escort ships, submarine and air anti-submarine warfare forces, amphibious assault and gunfire support ships and sealift forces.

Among the requirements in strategic forces, Mr. Ignatius said, is the conversion of six ballistic missile submarines to the "Poseidon" C-3 missile capability and funding to procure long leadtime items for an additional nine such submarines.

"The Poseidon missiles will carry multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles. Each missile will be capable of carrying multiple warheads, if required, to meet an expanding Soviet anti-ballistic missile threat."



Secretary Ignatius

He told Congress the Navy has not neglected its follow-on strategic offensive concepts, pointing to the four final STRAT-X candidate systems, two of which will be sea-based. The first of the Navy STRAT-X candidate systems, the Undersea Long-Range Missile System, would be a new force of specially configured submarines armed with advanced long range ballistic missiles, while the second, the Ship-based Long-Range Missile System, would use surface ships as a firing platform.

Naval Tactical Air Forces

To retain a modern force of attack carriers, the Navy is requesting FY69 funds for additional long leadtime nuclear components for one nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.

"This carrier would be fully funded in FY70. Another nuclear-powered carrier is programmed for FY71. Since these ships will be of the Nimitz class, we plan to procure the first two carriers on a multi-year basis with an option for the third carrier. When our presently programmed new ships are delivered, the attack carrier force will consist of four nuclear-powered carriers in addition to the eight Forrestal-class and three Midway-class carriers."

The Navy's FY69 budget also includes funds for the continuing procurement of the latest versions of the A-7 Corsair II, the F-4 Phantom, the

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Chief of Naval Operations Outlines Continuing Challenges to U.S. Seapower

American seapower must be ready to "meet and defeat" the challenges of other potential seapowers in either limited "brush fire" or larger scale wars, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Thomas H. Moorer told the American Ordnance Association in Washington, D.C., Feb. 19.

The task, he said, is a continuing one, "and because of the change that is always with us, we must avoid the danger of becoming 'embalmed' in a single weapon or a single weapon system . . . if we are to maintain the necessary power and flexibility of our naval forces."

Basic Seapower Principles

Fundamental to the caliber and composition of the U.S. naval arsenal are three basic seapower principles:

(1) The Navy does not believe in a single strategy or a single weapons system.

"Rather, we believe that the military posture of the United States must be flexible enough to respond quickly by the discriminate and selective use of force to the degree any particular situation dictates."

(2) The Navy does believe that the coordinated combat power of all the U.S. Armed Services must be projected overseas in any type of conflict.

"We fully recognize the Navy's role in the support of all other services in this regard."

(3) The Navy believes no matter how complex or how awesome weapons are built, man is still the vital element in the U.S. defense team.

"A weapons designer must always keep in the forefront of his mind the fact that the weapon which he designs will never be more than a tool to be employed by the intelligence of man."

One factor in determining the precise size, numbers and caliber of U.S. forces and weapons is "necessarily the capability of any potential adversary." An example is the Soviet Union Navy, second only to the U.S. in size and firepower.

Referring to recent statements by Soviet Fleet Admiral Gorshkov, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations said "many of the Soviet views of seapower today are a reflection of our own."

Adm. Moorer said the Soviet Fleet Admiral "proudly stated that the 1968 Soviet Navy has changed completely . . . with additions of new classes of ships, with increased speed and almost unlimited range; armed with ballistic, winged, anti-aircraft and anti-submarine rockets. The Soviet Chief went on to say that their ships have long range homing torpedoes and new types of traditional weapons with increased muzzle velocities, greater ranges and better accuracy . . . as well as new rocket-equipped aircraft, anti-submarine aircraft and helicopters that can unpreventably hit surface ships and submarines.

"Summing up the role of the Soviet Navy, Gorshkov stated that because of increased capability, the Soviet Navy now has a greater role in the general system of the armed forces and warns that we (the U.S.) can expect in the future to see a greater number of Soviet ships in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Ocean areas."

Soviet Message Clear

The Chief of Naval Operations stated "the message rings out loud and clear on the forward technical movement of the Soviet naval arsenal. These material increases and improvements in Soviet naval capabilities are tangible evidence which we can measure. We can only assume that the technical growth of the Soviet Navy reflects the Soviet strategy and thereby gives us some indication of their political aims."

Looking toward the U.S. Navy's future, Adm. Moorer pointed to some new types of weapons the Navy hopes to see built into its ships, including:

- Lightweight guns and their solid state, digital, computerized fire control systems;
- New anti-air warfare missiles—a surface-to-surface missile, advanced point defense missile, advanced surface-to-air missile, "Sea Sparrow," and advanced variations of missiles presently in the Navy's arsenal;
- Rocket assisted projectiles, and high velocity sabot projectiles with greatly increased ranges, and with mil accuracies of the order of current naval guns.
- New ASW torpedoes — submarine, ship and aircraft launched.
- New mines of greater versatility, reliability and effectiveness.

These needs are representative of complete weapons systems and munitions needed to insure necessary firepower when required to reinforce Navy tactics and strategies, Adm. Moorer said.

New Components Needed

In addition, we need to increase our quality and reliability with some new components, he said. Specifically, some examples of areas where particular improvement will pay off large dividends are:

- New lightweight body armor for personnel—cockpit and boat crewman protection is a vital need;
- Unsinkable, light draft, armored small boats with "plenty of firepower" and less vulnerable to mines and mortars;
- An automatic recoilless rifle with self-combustible ammunition to increase available firepower.

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COLLECTIVE SECURITY OR ISOLATIONISM?

Below are excerpts from Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's recent Posture Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Previous excerpts appeared in the Feb. 21 issue.

We, and some of our allies, have had to pay a particularly high price, both in lives and in wealth, for the [Free World] alliances' achievements—first in Korea during the early 1950s and now again in Southeast Asia. So, the American people have a right to ask: Were these achievements worth their cost, particularly in terms of their ultimate contribution to the peace and security of our own Nation?

I believe they were. But . . . there is no way by which we can determine with certainty what the world and this country would have looked like today had we not based our national security policy on the principle of collective defense during the last 20-odd years. However, we do know that the policies of unarmed isolationism and attempted neutrality, which we followed prior to World War II, were in the end far more costly in lives and property.

Moreover, it must be clearly recognized that while it is conceivable that we could return to a policy of isolationism, today this could no longer be the unarmed isolationism of the 1930s. In an age of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, when other nations have the capability to strike our homeland a devastating blow with perhaps only a few minutes of warning, such an easy option is denied us.

"Fortress America" Surrounded

Nevertheless, one could argue that we could still renounce all of our mutual defense treaties, pull back our military forces to our own soil, and build a "Fortress America" so powerful as to deter virtually any enemy or combination of enemies from deliberately attacking our territory. Then we could deal with the rest of the world on a strictly arms-length basis. But that would be an entirely different world than the one we now live in—and an entirely different United States as well!

Without dependable friends or allies, we would surely have to maintain a larger military establishment than at present. We would also have to reorient our industry and commerce to achieve a maximum degree of economic self-sufficiency with a lower standard of living for our people, and considerably less economic freedom for all.

Most important, we would be living in a far more uncertain and dangerous world, one in which our influence over the course of events would be greatly diminished. It would also be a world in which the pressures for proliferation of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery would be much stronger than they are today. In time, we could find ourselves literally isolated, a "Fortress America" still relatively prosperous, but surrounded by a sea of struggling, envious and unfriendly nations—a situation hardly calculated to strengthen our own state of peace and security.

Isolationism is clearly an undesirable alternative to our continued involvement in the responsibilities of world affairs and collective defense. This does not mean, however, that we must assume the role of "world policeman." But it does mean that we must be willing to continue to support those international arrangements which help to preserve world peace, alleviate conflicts among nations and create conditions for economic and social progress in the less developed areas of the world.

Sharing in Collective Defense

I would hope that our allies and friends will similarly recognize that the new international situation is too complicated and threatening for any sudden abandonment by them of the collective defense of freedom and independence. The principle that every nation should feel secure in its independence is still valid, and it cannot easily be ignored in one part of the world and sustained in another. The contribution of individual nations to this goal can take many forms, and there is admittedly no precise way to determine any nation's fair share of the burden.

We, on our part, must recognize that some of our friends and allies simply do not have the economic strength or industrial capacity to equip and maintain the armed forces they legitimately need. . . . It is in the common interest that these nations be furnished the necessary financial and material support, not only by the United States, but also by the other more prosperous members of the alliances. There have been some encouraging moves in that direction, but too great a share is still being furnished by the United States.

[However] I think it is of the utmost importance for us to remember that the non-Communist world is made up of sovereign states which have widely differing histories, capabilities, and political and economic orientations. Even where these states subscribe in principle to the policy of collective security, we should not expect that there will always be a unanimity of view as to how and by whom that policy should be implemented in any particular situation.

However . . . a much more fundamental problem . . . is growing unwillingness to face up to the fact that if the policy of collective defense is to work, we must be ready to pay our share of the price of supporting it. . . . Of all nations we have the most at stake. . . . For my part, I am convinced that we will judge the alternatives to a continued dedication to collective defense to be unacceptable.

FY69 Navy Program

(Continued from page 1)

RA-5C Vigilante. To meet "the likely threats" of the mid-70s, the Navy has requested $30 million for Contract Definition for the proposed high performance fighter aircraft, the VFAX.

Funds for 30 production F-111B aircraft, with the Phoenix Missile System, is also included in the FY69 Navy budget. "We believe that the F-111B is the only aircraft now under development which, with the Phoenix missile, can fill the fleet interceptor role. . . . ."

Fleet Escort Ships

The Navy is requesting $246 million for procurement of five DX destroyers with a primary mission of anti-submarine warfare. "These ships will be effective multi-purpose destroyers—with the speed and endurance to operate with the faster forces of the '70s and possess significant shore bombardment capability."

Also recommended in the FY69 budget is the initiation of a five-ship nuclear-powered escort (DXGN) building program. The FY69 budget includes a request for $17 million to continue Contract Definition and $52 million for the procurement of long leadtime nuclear components for two of these ships.

"To provide for the proper mix of nuclear-powered and conventional-powered escorts, we are requesting your approval for a conventional-powered missile-configured destroyer (DXG) building program to be started in FY70.

"These ships will provide the balance of missile defense capability for other forces. To support this program, we are requesting $20 million in the FY69 budget for Contract Definition."

Submarine and Air ASW Forces

Included in the FY69 budget is a $62 million request for Contract Definition and development of engines and avionics for the VSX, which will replace the "aging S-2 aircraft" currently in use by the fleet. The nuclear attack submarine building program for FY69 includes construction of two SSNs and long leadtime items for the construction of two more SSNs in FY70.

"DUSTER" CREW—Members of the First Cavalry Div. man an M42 "Duster" tank during a search and destroy mission in Vietnam. The M42 has twin 4[illegible] millimeter guns, each of which fires at a rate of 120 rounds per minute.

Amphibious Assault and Gunfire Support Ships

"Our studies on a new landing force support ship, called the LFS, have substantiated the need for long range, accurate, quick response, gunfire support. We hope to complete Concept Formulation and begin Contract Definition in FY69."

Also included in the FY69 budget is a request for the procurement of one LHA general purpose amphibious assault ship and long leadtime funds for additional LHAs. "The LHA is designed to correct some of the deficiencies of the World War II amphibious assault ships and combines—into a single ship—the desirable features of several amphibious ship types.

"The mission of the LHA will be to transport and land elements of a landing force in an assault by helicopters, amphibian vehicles, or landing craft—or a combination of these methods. These ships will be an integral part of our future fast amphibious assault forces."

To support the Army's requirement for a specialized military sealift vehicle for rapid deployment and reinforcement of U.S. forces, the Navy is requesting funds for four fast deployment logistic (FDL) ships as the initial increment of a 30-ship multi-year program.

Strategic Forces

(Continued from Page 1)

bombers of both nations. We expect to maintain a ratio of superiority in separately targetable warheads of three or four to one as far ahead as we now plan, i.e. for the next six to eight years.

These developments do not alter the fundamental situation of mutual deterrence which has existed for several years. The U.S. will not permit the Soviet Union to achieve a capability which will give the Soviet leaders any reason to believe that they can gain any advantage by threatening the use of nuclear weapons against either the U.S. or its allies.

Regarding Soviet ballistic missile defenses, our intelligence estimate of Soviet capability remains as described in Secretary McNamara's statement to the Congress. The Soviets are deploying an ABM system around Moscow. With regard to the Tallinn system, the majority of our intelligence community no longer believes that this system has any significant ABM capability. Nevertheless, our own strategic forces have been planned on the assumption that the Soviets will deploy an ABM system across the Soviet Union, as well as building up their offensive forces to the levels we now expect. Our MIRV program, in particular, is designed to give us high confidence of penetrating any defenses the Soviets may deploy.

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